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Kegley Jnr, C.W. and Raymond, G.A. (1999) How Nations Make Peace, New York: St Martins Press and Worth Publishers.

Liberalism

At the heart of liberal theorizing about issues of war and peace is the contention that an unbridled pursuit of national self-interest is destructive. Rather than emphasizing self-help, liberalism ‘seeks to discover ways in which separate actors, with distinct interests, can organize themselves to promote economic efficiency and avoid destructive physical conflict, without renouncing either the economic or political freedoms that liberals hold dear’ (Keohone 1992, p.174). Power, for liberals, resides in adhering to ethical principles. For them ‘international behavior and outcomes arise from a multiplicity of motives, not merely security, at least if security is defined solely in military or strategic terms’ (Holsti 1995, p.44). Following a war, liberal theory counsels against approaching peace making from a zero-sum outlook that permits the winner to extract the greatest possible gains at the loser’s expense, stressing the principle of reciprocity that is predicated on the expectation that behavior sent will be returned in kind. To maximize the prospects for enduring peace, liberal theorists reason that harsh punishments and staggering penalties will backfire, while clemency and compassion will produce cooperation and compliance. [p.21]

Realism

For realists, liberal dreams of peace through conciliation ignore the nasty, brutish facts of international life: The strong dominate the weak, the powerful take advantage of the powerless, and relations between former enemies are determined more by the military might each possesses than by principled concern for each other’s security and status. … Realism believes power trumps principles. To the realist, the road to ruin is paved with utopian hopes about the good will of others or the applicability of morality to the ruthless struggle for power in international relations among [p.22] rival nations seeking self-advantage: ‘States … should not be held to the same moral standards as individuals because to do so subverts their capacity to conduct prudent policy’ (Monoson and Loriaux 1998, p.288). From this realist ethical posture, peace settlements should not be grounded in expectations that an adversary will reciprocate kindness, because defeated states are likely to interpret generosity as weakness and use lenient treaties as an opportunity to resume the pursuit of power. Apprehensive over the possibility that an indignant loser will try to avenge its battlefield humiliation, realists recommend firm settlements as the only reliable method of maintaining postwar peace. [p.23]

…. Liberalism and realism, the two most common theoretical lenses policymakers use when inspecting the political topography of the postwar world, advance diametrically opposed recommendations. Policymakers need a theory backed by evidence that answers the questions of how nations should make peace. Which theory – liberalism or realism – offers the strongest basis for developing policy prescriptions to guide peace making in the wake of war? [p.23]

Moral Principles and Policy Prescriptions for the Resolution of Armed Conflict

... Mirror imaging, the propensity of each side in a conflict to see in its own actions only rectitude and in those of the adversary only malice, reduces the prospects for leniency by the winner and acquiesence by the loser. In such an atmosphere of mutual distrust, victors face difficult choices in sorting out short-term desires from long-term interests. What they want may not be what they need.  Even from an advantaged position in which the enemy surrendered unconditionally, the victor must still decide what kind of peace agreement would enhance security. Should the peace be lenient or punitive? Can it combine elements of conciliation with retribution? How will the prostrate enemy respond? What countermoves are likely once the loser recovers from defeat? Military triumph solves certain problems but creates new ones. ...

Given the far-reaching repercussions that result from how victors deal with the defeated, what steps can be taken to solidify a durable peace settlement? ...

Prescription 1: Military strategy in war fighting should be coordinated with the political strategy for peace making.

At the root of the danger is the difficulty of separating military objectives from basic national goals. Although people tend to see a country's foreign policy as the product of a single calculating intelligence, in fact most governments are amalgams of large, semiautonomous bureaucratic organizations that have their own interests and hold different conceptions of national security. Since policy is often formulated by a small group of senior officials, each of whom may occupy a leadership position within one of these organizations, it can be difficult to orchestrate words and deeds in a coherent program that will be implemented faithfully by subordinates. Fearing that bureaucratic politics [p.231] contaminate military decisions, the armed forces sometimes are given substantial leeway in shaping the conduct of the war. Yet when crucial military and political decisions are compartmentalized, battlefield triumphs may not advance political aims. ...

... The purpose of coordinating political and military strategy is to ensure that the process of war termination facilitates postwar peace building. Although political leaders decide war aims, they must avoid the temptation to micromanage the war effort and never lose sight of their responsibility for seeing that military action should service the political goal of making peace. [p.234]

Prescription 2: Planning for the postwar era must begin early.

Unfortunately ... postwar policies rarely emerge from deliberative plans; they unfold incrementally through a tyranny of small decisions, owing more to impulse than design. Lacking a grand strategy for the world of their making, victors usually improvise and muddle through the immediate aftermath of war. ...

To prevent policy drift, victors need to project what is likely to occur at the end of the war, anticipate the potential obstacles to a lasting peace settlement, and design a plan for surmounting them. Planning means forecasting the range of plausible futures, setting clear goals for attaining a specific desired future, and recommending actions for realizing that future. The sooner a formal attempt is undertaken to accomplish these tasks, the greater the chances that decisionmakers will be alerted to peace-making opportunities they might otherwise miss.

Prescription 3: Prepare the public for the transition from war to peace.